Introduction
On May 27, 2015 seven FIFA officials were arrested. 4 On the same day, Swiss authorities seized electronic data and documents from the FIFA headquarters and "opened criminal 
Main notions and assumptions of the analysis
The FIFA executive committee allocated the 2018 and 2022 FIFA world cups by an exhaustive ballot. 6 If there is an alternative that has more than 50%+1 vote, than it is the final outcome. Otherwise, the alternative with the least number of votes is eliminated and the committee votes again for the remaining alternatives. Voting ends when there is an alternative, which has a simple majority. In the case of ties, there is an intermediate voting between tied alternatives. If just two bids are left and there is a tie, then FIFA President Sepp Blatter has the deciding vote. There are 24 members in the executive committee, but only 22 of them were eligible to vote. In this case 12 votes were needed for a simple majority.
This rule is very similar to Hare's rule or the Instant run-off rule, which is considered one of the least manipulable rules (Aleskerov et al. 2011 (Aleskerov et al. , 2012 . The main difference is that in the Instant run-off rule all the information about the preferences is provided at the beginning and voters rank all the alternatives in advance, while for exhaustive ballot system voter can vote 4 differently at each stage. It is easy to see that this may lead to higher manipulation. An example of such a situation can be found in Davies et al. (2012) .
In this paper we identify possible strategic voters and find the result of voting under sincere preferences. The problem has been little studied in the literature mostly because it is hard to find whether the voters have been manipulated or not. Indeed, in order to do this we need information about sincere preferences, however, this is impossible because this is the private information of the voter. Dey et al. (2015) detect possible manipulations in some elections assuming that the sincere outcome is known by the authority. In this paper, using some rather weak assumptions, we find strategic voters without requiring any additional information about either sincere preferences or a sincere outcome.
Let us define voter types. We have been using the terms informally already. At each round voters are informed about the alternatives available and are asked to vote for their best alternative. If the voter is sincere she should just vote for the best available option according to her sincere preferences. In the case when she votes for any alternative other than the best available one, we call her strategic.
One reason votes are strategic is to achieve a better overall voting outcome. This is especially important in the case of sequential voting: if voter expect that his best alternative may be eliminated at some stage of the voting, then he may decide to vote for another one instead.
Another reason to vote strategically is to influence the elimination order. Let us formulate the proposition, which allows us to detect manipulators. 
World Cup host country elections
Let us characterize all sincere voting profiles compatible with the selection process. We start with 2018 World Cup host country election process. According to procedure, during the first round, there was no simple majority and England was eliminated, having the least number of votes. During the second round, Russia got an absolute majority (13 out of 22) and won the election. From the voting process, we make the following propositions:
Proposition 2: There were at least 2 strategic voters in the 2018 World Cup host country elections.
Proof. This follows directly from the definition of revealed dishonesty. One can see that the results in Table 1 contradict Proposition 1 because votes for Netherlands/Belgium joint bid decreased by 2. We can say that 2 voters who prefer the Netherlands/Belgium joint bid for any other alternative decided to vote strategically and do not vote for their best alternative.
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Proposition 3: All sincere voting profiles compatible with the results in Table 1 appear in Table 2 ), or their third-best alternative (2-m voters of this type in the sincere profile in The uncertainty with the votes at the third round is based on the second preference of sincere voters, whose best alternative is Netherlands/Belgium. We can summarize the results in a following proposition.
Proposition 4. If all committee members vote sincerely the winner of 2018 World Cup host country elections will be Russia.
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In other words, the results of voting were not influenced by strategic behaviour of two voters.
World Cup host country elections
Let us apply the same algorithm to the other election on the same day. This case is more complex, especially because votes for the Qatar-the winner of the election decreased in the second round. This is one of the reasons why the 2022 elections were considered controversial (see, for example Morris 2011) . At the same time, using the definition of strategic voting, we can make the following proposition. It is easy to outline the 2 strategic voters in this case. We can see that one strategic voter has Japan as her best alternative, and the other one has Qatar. Let us study the case from the fourth round. Since there are just 2 alternatives left, 14 voters prefer Qatar and 8 USA. In Round 3, 5 voters declare South Korea as their best available alternative. It is easy to show that two of them prefer USA to Qatar and 3 have the different preferences. Sincere profile for last two rounds is given in We get the first line in the voting profile from voting results using the assumption that they start to vote for their best alternative, the results of the first round of voting, and the vote of the committee member whose best alternative is Australia. In Tables 6 and 7 we assume that his vote transferred to the USA and in Table 8 we assume that this vote goes to South Korea. That is why in the Tables 6 and 7 there are 4 voters with USA and 4 voters with South Korea at the first place and in Table 8 there are 5 voters with South Korea at the first place.
Let us look at the second-best alternatives. We start with the voters who have Japan in the first place. In the case of sincere voting after the first round votes no country can increase by more than 1. Due to the fact that the votes for the USA bid increased by two, we can see that at least one of this votes comes from strategic voter. Moreover, for Table 6 case this strategic voter   9 has Japan in the first place, for Korea. In Round 3 we assume that he decided to turn back to his sincere preferences and voted for Qatar. As South Korea in Round 3 remains the same, one voter with Japan as the best alternative should have South Korea as the second best. Since for sincere voting the votes should increase for the USA bid from Round 1 to Round 2 from 3 to 4, for two other voters, who prefer Japan, the second-best alternative should be USA. For the same reason for Table 7 there are 2 voters with Japan on the first and USA at the second place of the preferences. Note that there were 4 (Table 6 and 7) or 5 (Table 8) voters with the South Korea in the first place, but we do not know much about their preferences. Taking into account the information from Table 5 we can only say that there are 3 voters who prefer Qatar to USA and 2 voters who prefer the opposite, but cannot exactly say anything about the position of Japan in these preferences. Now we can find the results of voting for the sincere voting profiles. Tables 6 and 7 It is easy to show that for these profiles sincere voting process will look as in In other words, if strategic behaviour does not influence the elimination order, then the sincere result will be the same. Table 8 the sincere outcome may be either South Korea, Japan or Qatar. If more than 11 voters prefer USA to Japan (or exactly 11 voters and the FIFA president is among them), then Japan will be eliminated in Round 2, and results of the voting will remain the same. Otherwise, there are 4 possible situations:
Proposition 6. For the preferences profiles in

Proposition 7. For the preferences profile in
Case 1: If at least 1 voter with USA as the best alternative has Qatar as his second best, then the final result is Qatar.
Case 2: If all 3 voters have Japan in second place, and if 11 voters prefer Japan to Qatar and the FIFA president is among them, then Japan is the final outcome. Otherwise, Qatar is the winner.
Case 3: If 2 voters have Japan on the second place and 1 has South Korea, and if more than 11 voters prefer Japan to South Korea, 11 voters prefer Japan to Qatar and the FIFA president is among them, then Japan is the final outcome. If less than 11 voters prefer Japan to South Korea, 11 voters prefer South Korea to Qatar and the FIFA president is among them, then South Korea is the final outcome. For exactly 11 voters who prefer Japan to South Korea the result depends on the FIFA president preferences. In all other cases Qatar is the winner. Proof. The proof of these proposition is straightforward. For Case 1, if at least 1 voter has Qatar as his second best then at the Round 3 Qatar will get 12 votes and will have simple majority.
For Case 2 at Round 3, South Korea will be eliminated and at Round 4 there may be a tie between Qatar and Japan. If 11 voters including the FIFA president prefer Japan to Qatar, then Japan is the winner.
For Case 3 there will be a tie between South Korea and Japan at Round 3. Depending on the result of the tie-breaking (voting between these two alternatives) either Japan or South Korea goes to the Round 4. Then in Round 4 there may be the tie between Qatar and Japan or South Korea and if 11 committee members including the FIFA president votes against Qatar, then Japan or South Korea will be the final result.
and South Korea at the Round 4. If 11 voters including the FIFA president prefer South Korea to Qatar, then South Korea is the winner.
Discussion of the results
In this paper we analysed the real election process that took place on 2 December, 2010 when the 2018 and 2022 World Cup host countries where chosen. While in both cases there were two strategic voters, in the 2018 vote they did not influence the results but in the 2022 voting they may have changed the winner of the elections.
At the same time these examples also underline some adverse feature of this rule: due to its sequential nature it allows a change votes between rounds. One way to minimize this type of strategic behaviour is to ask committee members to provide the initial ordering of their bids.
Although this will not completely eliminate manipulation, it will decrease the strategy space by prohibiting changes of votes if the alternative one has voted for is still available. In other words, it will change the exhaustive ballot system to an Instant run-off.
Even if we rule out sequential voting there still can be some questions for the voting results: whether results may be influenced by possible vote buying. In other words, we can omit the assumption that their first declared alternative is their best and try to answer the question: how many committee members need to be bribed (or in other way induced to cast a different vote) in order to change the voting result to Russia or Qatar. In both situations let us find the least number of voters that need to be bribed consistent with some true voting profile. In other words we want to find the minimal size of a coalition needed to change the voting results from the original winner to any other alternative. Since it is sequential voting, a change in voting results means the change in the elimination process. Let us assume only the situations when bribed committee members vote for Russia or Qatar. So we will not consider more elaborate strategies when someone induced committee members to vote for the non-winners to influence elimination order.
Let us consider 2018 host country elections. How many votes would need to have been changed in order to have Russia to be eliminated in the first round? We can see that the minimum number is 4. Moreover, 3 of them should have voted for England and 1 for the Netherlands/Belgium joint bid. In this case there will be a tie between England, Netherlands/Belgium and Russia: all of them will have 5 votes and Spain/Portugal will have 7 votes. According to procedure there will be additional voting between tied alternatives and the one with the least votes will be eliminated. Assuming that the votes from Spain/Portugal voters will go to England or Netherlands/Belgium bids, Russia may be eliminated. If any of these assumptions are not true, then minimum number of voters is higher.
In order to eliminate Russia in the second round minimum number of voters needed should also be 4. Moreover, 3 of them should vote for Netherlands/Belgium bid in the second round. In this case there will be a tie between Russia and either Spain/Portugal or Netherlands/Belgium. If fewer voters prefer Russia, then Russia will be eliminated. As in the previous case if any assumptions are not true, then minimal number of voters is higher. We also assume that two strategic voters will not manipulate in this case, because they will just lower the chances of the Netherlands/Belgium bid. If these two voters behave in a same way, then the minimum number of voters will be 6. In order to eliminate Russia in the third round, we should know the preferences of voters with Netherlands/Belgium bid on the first place. In order to have
Round 3 all of them should vote sincerely. We know the preferences of 2 members (see Table 2 ).
If the other 2 prefer Spain/Portugal over R, then during Round 3 there will be 13 votes for Russia and 9 for Spain/Portugal. In this case the minimum number of votes needed to change the result is 2 if Sepp Blatter prefers Spain/Portugal and 3 if not. Therefore if Russia is not a real winner, then at least 2 committee members need to be bribed or in other way induced to change their vote for Russia.
Let us do the same analysis for 2022. If someone wants to have Qatar eliminated in the first round at least 7 voters should change their votes. Moreover, 3 of them should vote for Australia, 1 for Japan and 1 for USA. In this case there will be a tie between Qatar and 2-3 other bids, depending on the votes of 2 remaining voters. If Qatar lose the tie-breaking, then it will be eliminated. In order to eliminate Qatar in second round at least 6 votes should change their votes.
If strategic voters will behave in a same way as before, then at least 5 voters is needed at the second round, since one of the strategic voters changes his vote from Qatar to some other bid during this round. For elimination at Round 3 at least 4 voters are needed and losing in the tiebreaking. Results for Round 4 depend on the true profile from the previous section. In the case of Tables 6 and 7 at least 3 voters is needed if Sepp Blatter prefer USA over Qatar or 4 otherwise.
In the case of Table 8 at the last round there will be a voting between Qatar and South Korea or Japan and there is not enough information about preferences between them. So according to proposition 7 it is possible that the true result is South Korea and Japan. In other words, no committee members should be specially forced to vote for Qatar and Qatar may be the winner because of manipulation at the second round.
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In an interview in February 2016 8 , Sepp Blatter states that he expected USA to win the election but Michel Platini (and maybe several others) were forced to vote for Qatar. If the true winner should have been USA then at least 3 voters were needed to change the result to Qatar, assuming that Sepp Blatter himself voted for USA. If the true winner was South Korea or Japan, then at least 1 committee member (one of the strategic voters in real election) was needed to guarantee that Japan was eliminated at the second round.
Overall, we can see that in both cases there were strategic voters who influenced the results and helped Russia and Qatar become host countries. If we eliminate their influence, then Russia still should be the winner, but the decision-making process would take three rounds instead of two. In 2022 winner may change to either South Korea or Japan. If we consider how stable the results are, we can show that at least 1 committee member was needed to change the results from true winner to Qatar, and at least 2 members in case of Russia.
